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Professors make their mark
Scholarship bears fruit

decoding the power of stories

In a split decision, Massachusetts’ highest court
abolished felony murder in that state – and both the
majority and the minority cited scholarly writing by
SUnY Distinguished Professor and Hodgson Russ
Faculty Scholar Guyora Binder in their rationales.
Previously, participants in certain felonies that
resulted in death were liable for first-degree murder,
even if they did not expect death to result. In the 2017
case of Commonwealth v. Timothy Brown, however, the
court relied on Professor Binder’s
research in concluding that the
Massachusetts murder statute
does not require this. It only
imposes first degree murder
liability on those who commit
murder in the course of such
felonies. The Court held that in the
future, defendants cannot be
convicted of murder without proof
of either intent to kill, intent to inflict
grievous bodily harm, or extreme
indifference to human life.
A minority of the judges cited Professor Binder’s
research in arguing that some felons who cause death
inadvertently deserve murder liability. However, the
majority responded that such cases would likely still
qualify for murder liability in Massachusetts on the
basis of intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or extreme
indifference to human life.
“Massachusetts defines factors like gross recklessness and extreme indifference more expansively than
most other American jurisdictions do. … My historical
scholarship told the majority that they had the power to
abolish felony murder, it was a judicially created rule in
Massachusetts.”
In the case, Commonwealth vs. Timothy Brown, the
defendant provided a gun and hooded sweatshirts to
his co-defendants, but was not present when they
committed a robbery and shot and killed two victims.
The appropriateness of the felony murder law was
one of several issues raised on appeal, with the
defendant’s lawyers arguing that it was arbitrary and
unjust. Binder says there had been hints in a previous
case that the Supreme Judicial Court was looking for an
opportunity to reassess the law.
“They decided it was time,” says Binder, whose
scholarly books include Felony murder (Stanford
University Press), “and they were waiting for a case with
sympathetic facts that illustrated the potential injustice
of the felony murder rules.”
The court’s decision is available at
www.tinyurl.com/y75v3mbw.

Can someone whose story keeps changing be a credible witness
for herself? That is the question at the heart of an article by legal
analysis, writing and research lecturer, Stephen Paskey, that takes a
critical look at how federal immigration judges decide whether to
grant refugees’ asylum requests.
The article, “Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility, and the
Adversarial Adjudication of Claims for Asylum,” was published last
year in the Santa Clara Law Review. Now it has been recognized with
the Penny Pether Law & Language Scholarship Award, given
biennially to acknowledge excellence in
interdisciplinary law scholarship, especially
work drawing on language theory. The award
is named for Penny Pether, a distinguished
scholar who had a particular interest in
language and literature and a passion for social
justice. This is the third time the award has been
conferred; the previous winners were from
Harvard and Columbia Law Schools.
Paskey says the article grew out of his
experience as a litigating attorney with the U.S.
Department of Justice, where he represented
the government in hundreds of asylum hearings. The administrative
law judges who decide these cases, he says, typically base their
decisions on whether the petitioners tell a credible story about abuse
they have suffered in their homeland, or the threat of persecution if
they were to return. The issue of credibility often hinges on whether
the facts of the story stay consistent over the long course of the
application process, which typically includes both oral testimony and
a written declaration.
But an article by an Israeli scholar, noting that people who suffer
post-traumatic stress often tell fragmented, inconsistent narratives,
convinced him that factual consistency was not a fair criterion for
judging the plaintiff’s credibility.
With a grant from the Baldy Center for Law & Social Policy, he
studied 369 asylum decisions issued by federal appeals courts in
2010. What he found: “When immigration judges conclude an
applicant is not credible, they overwhelmingly rely on inconsistencies
within or among the various versions of the applicant’s story, and
especially inconsistencies between the testimony and declaration.”
The article uses the approach of structuralist narrative theory to
distinguish between the content of the story that a witness tells – its
timeline, characters and events – and the way the story is told. For
survivors of traumatic events, Paskey argues, it’s the latter that
coheres as evidence of truth-telling, rather than absolute consistency
in the details of the story.
His findings may change the way these asylum decisions are
made. “The hope,” he says, “is that further discussion would motivate
the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to provide training to all
immigration judges on the effects of trauma” – giving them the tools
to make better judgments in these life-and-death cases.
Paskey’s article can be accessed at www.tinyurl.com/yaxkgeet.

